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The legitimacy and effectiveness of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“ICSID”) is a matter of spirited debate. Opponents argue that ICSID’s ideological 
and procedural bias impedes fairness, its complexity and cost restrict access to justice, and 
its lack of an appeal process exacerbates uncertainty and unpredictability. Dissatisfaction 
with and ideological critique of ICSID, especially on the part of Latin American states, 
culminated in 2009 when Ecuador proposed the creation of a regional arbitration centre as 
part of the Union of South American Nations (“UNASUR”). This article surveys the myriad 
criticisms launched against ICSID and assesses the likelihood and desirability of the UNASUR 
Arbitration Centre as an alternative or supplement to ICSID. The article concludes that 
reforms to ICSID can address most of the problems identified by critics but that the UNASUR 
Arbitration Centre will continue to gain momentum. The result will be a hybrid international 
investment law regime, at least in the short- to medium-term. This hybrid regime will be 
functional, serve an important purpose for Latin American countries, and advance the goals 
of investment liberalization.
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La légitimité et l’efficacité du Centre international pour le règlement des différends relatifs 
aux investissements (« CIRDI ») font l’objet d’un débat animé. Ses opposants avancent que le 
parti pris idéologique et procédurier du CIRDI l’empêche d’être équitable, que sa complexité 
et son coût restreignent l’accès à la justice et que l’absence d’un processus d’appel exacerbe 
l’incertitude et l’imprévisibilité. L’insatisfaction à son égard et la critique idéologique du 
CIRDI, particulièrement de la part des pays latino-américains, ont culminé en 2009 lorsque 
l’Équateur a proposé la création d’un centre régional d’arbitration dans le cadre de l’Union 
des nations sud-américaines (« UNASUR »). Cet article passe en revue la multitude des 
critiques soulevées à l’égard du CIRDI et tente d’évaluer la vraisemblance et la souhaitabilité 
du centre d’arbitration de l’UNASUR comme alternative ou complément du CIRDI. L’ article 
conclut que des réformes du CIRDI pourraient régler la plupart des problèmes soulevés 
par les critiques, mais que le centre d’arbitration de l’UNASUR continuera de prendre de 
l’essor. Il en résultera, du moins à court ou moyen terme, un régime hybride d’arbitration 
des investissements internationaux. Ce régime hybride sera fonctionnel, très utile pour les 
pays d’Amérique latine et fera progresser les objectifs de libéralisation des investissements.
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THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
(“ICSID”) is in a state of crisis. Although it has grown in membership and 
activity1 and is gaining prominence in a global economic environment that 
embraces escalating levels of foreign investment, ICSID has seen its third 
membership withdrawal since 20072 and is virtually under non-stop attack.3 
Latin America has been a special pressure point. In recent years, the burden of 
the dramatic rise in the number of ICSID arbitration requests has fallen most 
heavily on South American countries, which have become respondents to claims 
from the United States, Europe, and beyond. Today, Latin American states are 
respondents in 65 of 213 pending cases.4 More than one-quarter involve just two 
1. As of 31 December 2014, 159 states have signed on to the ICSID Convention, 150 of 
which have deposited instruments of ratification or acceptance. As of 31 December 2014, 
there are more than 2,700 bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) in existence, and ICSID 
has registered 390 investment dispute cases. See International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, “Background Information on the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID),” online: <icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/
Documents/ICSID%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf>.
2. After a barrage of anti-ICSID commentary from President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela gave 
notice of its withdrawal in January 2012. See Luis Britto Garcia, “We Have to Get Out of 
the ICSID” (24 January 2012), online: <venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6766>. Bolivia and 
Ecuador gave notice in May 2007 and July 2009, respectively.
3. See e.g. Michael Wilson, “The Enron v. Argentina Annulment Decision: Moving a Bishop 
Vertically in the Precarious ICSID System” (2012) 43:2 U Miami Inter-Am L Rev 347 at 
353 (cautioning that while Enron added a “talismanic piece to the ICSID puzzle,” it leaves 
the proper scope of annulment review ambiguous and expansive); Julien Fouret, “The World 
Bank and ICSID: Family or Incestuous Ties?” (2007) 4:1 Int’l Org L Rev 121 (clarifying 
the possible conflicts of interest between ICSID and the World Bank and identifying 
associated structural and philosophical problems); Susan D Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent 
Decisions” (2005) 73:4 Fordham L Rev 1521 [Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis”] (describing 
three sets of inconsistent decisions that have caused uncertainty and unpredictability). See 
also Emmanuel Gaillard, “The Denunciation of the ICSID Convention” (2007) 237:122 
NYLJ 3. But see Sergio Puig, “Emergence and Dynamism in International Organizations: 
ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration & International Investment Law” (2013) 44:2 Geo J Int’l 
L 531 (admitting that ICSID has serious challenges that merit action but providing evidence 
that contradicts claims of ICSID’s unprecedented crisis and explaining that much can be 
learned from corrective measures previously taken elsewhere); Charles N Brower & Stephan 
W Schill, “Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment 
Law?” (2009) 9:2 Chicago J Int’l L 471 at 473 (conceding that unpredictability and 
incoherence are issues in need of “serious attention” but arguing that a solution will come 
“with the passage of time”).
4. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, “Cases,” online: <icsid.
worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx?cs=CD27>.
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countries—Argentina and Venezuela—while less than one-twelfth involve major 
developed countries.5
In the midst of denunciation and defence and upheaval and entrenchment, 
the questions on ICSID’s horizon are as numerous as they are varied. Is ICSID 
structurally, procedurally, functionally, or ideologically deficient? Can these 
deficiencies be justified? Why have major destinations for foreign investment 
such as Brazil never acceded to the ICSID Convention? Should domestic courts be 
preferred over international forums? Would a Union of South American Nations 
(“UNASUR”) Arbitration Centre jeopardize ICSID’s future superiority in the 
increasingly chaotic investment dispute settlement discussion?
This article focuses on these issues primarily within the Latin American 
context. It proceeds in four parts. Part I synthesizes the criticisms levelled against 
ICSID over the past decade. Part II surveys existing suggestions for reform, 
including the introduction of an appellate body and the option of recourse to 
domestic courts. It argues that while these reforms would resolve some problems, 
they would likely be insufficient to suppress pressures for transformation over the 
long term. Part III shifts the focus to Latin American countries, chronicling their 
adverse reactions to ICSID.
Finally, Part IV outlines the major tenets of Ecuador’s proposal for an 
arbitration centre under the rubric of UNASUR, analyzing its strengths and 
weaknesses and situating it in the larger geopolitical context. Ultimately, this 
article contends that despite the proposal’s promise, its inherent weaknesses and 
related geopolitical factors are likely to result in a hybrid regime for international 
investment arbitration. This hybrid system will better serve the interests of both 
developed and developing countries by allowing for a regional dispute resolution 
forum for some disputes while broadly advancing the goals of investment 
liberalization.
5. Ibid.
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I. CHALLENGES TO ICSID: IMBALANCE AND 
INCONSISTENCY
On 18 March 1965, the ICSID Convention6 established ICSID, an autonomous 
international institution whose primary purpose is to provide facilities for 
conciliating and arbitrating international investment disputes. Entering into 
force on 14 October 1966, the ICSID Convention sought to remove impediments 
to the free international flow of private investment posed by non-commercial 
risks and the absence of specialized international methods for investment 
dispute settlement.7
Before ICSID’s establishment, no forum functioned effectively as a means of 
settling investment disputes directly between a private party and a government. 
Thus, the development of ICSID’s arbitration procedures was a reaction to 
this existing gap in international law.8 ICSID’s novel institutionalization of 
investor-state arbitration9 was unheard of until that point.10 The promise of 
increased foreign direct investment supplied states with a reason to concede 
6. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 18 March 1965, (entered into force 14 October 1966), online: International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes <icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/
CRR_English-final.pdf> [ICSID Convention]. For general information on ICSID and 
investment treaties, see Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, 
Cases and Materials (Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) at 363-451 
(discussing the mechanics of ICSID arbitration proceedings); Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph 
Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012) at 28-43; Christoph H Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) (providing a thorough description of the 
history, financing, jurisdiction, and implementation of ICSID).
7. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, “About ICSID,” online: <icsid.
worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/about/pages/default.aspx>.
8. See Amazu A Asouzu, “A Review and Critique of Arbitral Awards on Article 25(2)(b) of 
the ICSID Convention” (2002) 3:3 J World Investment 397 at 397 (describing ICSID 
as a “cardinal achievement of the World Bank in the development and advancement of 
international law”). ICSID’s purpose was partly to halt the practice of “gunboat diplomacy.” 
See Charles Vuylsteke, “Foreign Investment Protection and ICSID Arbitration” (1974) 4:2 
Ga J Int’l & Comp L 343 at 343-44.
9. By drafting agreements with investor-state arbitration clauses, signatory nations sought 
to depoliticize investment disputes and empower foreign investors in order to reduce the 
risk of investment. See Eric Gillman, “The End of Investor-State Arbitration in Ecuador? 
An Analysis of Article 422 of the Constitution of 2008” (2008) 19:2 Am Rev Int’l 
Arb 269 at 271.
10. See Ibironke T Odumosu, “The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the 
Third World” (2007) 8:2 San Diego Int’l LJ 345 at 356.
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control to international arbitrators.11 ICSID was seen to have a dual function: 
dispute resolution (in the narrower context of international investment law) and 
legal interpretation and clarification of other aspects of international law.12
Ninety-eight per cent of ICSID’s caseload consists of convention arbitration 
cases; the remainder is comprised of conciliation cases. While international 
commercial arbitration focuses on dispute settlement between private parties 
and interstate arbitration involves only states, ICSID’s jurisdiction encompasses 
legal disputes between any two of the following three parties: member countries, 
individual investors, and corporate entities.13 
As a party to a world order dominated by institutions and processes 
committed to the enhancement rather than distribution of wealth,14 ICSID 
has been a target of attack from various fronts since its inception. Governments 
and scholars from the developing world have formulated an extensive list of 
complaints. These include ICSID’s alleged pro-Western bias, its absence of an 
appeal mechanism, its lack of transparency, its complexity and cost, its lack of 
financial and management structures and corresponding inability to manage 
its burgeoning workload,15 cracks in its system of voluntary compliance and 
enforcement,16 and its inadequate attention to non-commercial interests such 
11. Notably, Brazil, the most successful country in Latin America at achieving this goal, is not a 
signatory to the ICSID Convention, and it has refused all BITs. Brazil ratified the UNASUR 
treaty, discussed below, in July 2011.
12. Susan L Karamanian, “Overstating the Americanization of International Arbitration: Lessons 
from ICSID” (2003) 19:1 Ohio St J Disp Resol 5 at 9.
13. Gautami S Tondapu, “International Institutions and Dispute Settlement: The Case of 
ICSID” (2010) 22:1 Bond L Rev 81 at 81-82.
14. See generally Davidson Budhoo, “IMF/World Bank Wreak Havoc on the Third World” in 
Kevin Danaher, ed, 50 Years is Enough: The Case Against the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (Brooklyn, NY: South End Press, 1994) 20.
15. See e.g. David Zaring, “Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law” (2008) 46:3 
Colum J Transnat’l L 563 (recommending ways to increase the formality and capacity of 
international institutions of rulemaking while maintaining sufficient flexibility).
16. See e.g. Olivia Chung, “The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect on 
the Future of Investor-State Arbitration” (2007) 47:4 Va J Int’l L 953 at 969-75 (explaining 
the tendency of states such as Indonesia and Pakistan to escape the regime by defying 
arbitration); Andrew P Tuck, “Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the 
Revisions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules” (2007) 
13:4 L & Bus Rev Am 885 at 905-10 (describing the threat of non-enforcement in Latin 
America and criticizing ICSID’s automatic enforcement mechanism as inadequate due to 
its problematic reliance on national courts). But see David R Sedlak, “ICSID’s Resurgence 
in International Investment Arbitration” (2004) 23:1 Penn St Int’l L Rev 147 at 161-70 
(arguing in favour of waiver clauses and other protective measures to alleviate the perceived 
weaknesses of ICSID award finality).
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as health or environmental protection.17 This article focuses on the first four 
of these issues. 
A. IDEOLOGICAL AND PROCEDURAL BIAS
The first major criticism is that ICSID has a pro-Western bias:18 ICSID is part 
of the World Bank Group; the World Bank funds the ICSID Secretariat; the 
governor of the World Bank is an ex officio member of ICSID’s governing body, 
the Administrative Council; and the president of the World Bank is the chairman 
of the Administrative Council.19 The World Bank’s intimate relationship with 
ICSID has led some Latin American states to complain that they cannot 
criticize ICSID for fear of hampering their access to World Bank credit.20 
While accountability was one reason for placing ICSID within the World Bank, 
in practice, it makes it difficult for developing countries to protect their own 
investment interests at the expense of more significant powers, especially as 
perceptions of disobedience or non-compliance are likely to have larger economic 
implications for the developing countries in question.
A related concern is that ICSID arbitration has done more to protect 
capital-exporting states and their investors than to address the economic and 
social interests of capital-importing states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.21 It 
seems ironic that whereas the World Bank was created to foster and buttress the 
economic development of developing states, one of its parts often seems to do the 
opposite. Most critics admit that ICSID does not have a responsibility to protect 
weaker parties, but they emphasize that ICSID has not been sufficiently cognizant 
of its position within the broader World Bank system, which at least theoretically 
demands that the interests of developing countries be taken into account.
17. See e.g. Odumosu, supra note 10.
18. For a parallel discussion of Western bias as it relates to the International Court of Justice, see 
generally Eric A Posner & Miguel FP de Figueiredo, “Is the International Court of Justice 
Biased?” (2005) 34:2 J Legal Stud 599.
19. Leon E Trakman, “The ICSID Under Siege” (2012) 45:3 Cornell Int’l LJ 603 at 611-12 
[Trakman, “The ICSID Under Siege”].
20. Ibrahim FI Shihata, “The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment: The Role of 
the World Bank, With Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA” (1986) 1:1 Am U J Int’l 
L & Pol’y 97 (providing an early discussion of the close relationship between ICSID and 
the World Bank).
21. Trakman, “The ICSID Under Siege,” supra note 19 at 606.
(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL1122
A third concern is that arbitration is biased in favour of investors.22 Article 
14(1) of the ICSID Convention states, “Persons designated to serve on the 
Panels shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in 
the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to 
exercise independent judgment.”23 While the composition of arbitral panels has a 
direct influence on legitimacy,24 ICSID tribunals seem to weigh on the side of the 
investor in a dominant proportion of investment arbitration cases.25 The process 
of disqualification is shrouded in secrecy, hindering the development of objective 
standards.26 If the threshold is whether the arbitrator demonstrates “actual or 
apparent partiality as well as if there is a risk or potential of bias,”27 the proper 
approach must respond to the need for the appearance of a fair process, which 
arguably does not exist across ICSID arbitration settings.28 Ultimately, these 
expressions of possible bias impair ICSID’s procedural fairness and contribute to 
developing states’ reticence to use ICSID as the premier forum for international 
investment arbitration disputes.
22. See e.g. Gus Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An 
Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2012) 50:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 211 [Van 
Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour”] (finding statistically significant evidence that arbitrators 
favour the positions of claimants over states and the position of claimants from Western 
capital-exporting states over claimants from other states).
23. Supra note 6, art 14(1).
24. Gabriel Bottini, “Should Arbitrators Live on Mars? Challenge of Arbitrators in Investment 
Arbitration” (2009) 32:2 Suffolk Transnat’l L Rev 341 (claiming that the independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators is the sine qua non of the system’s legitimacy and stressing the need 
for more exacting standards).
25. See Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra note 22.
26. See e.g. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and InterAguas Servicios Integrales 
del Agua SA v The Argentine Republic (2008) (International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes) (setting out the four factors of proximity, intensity, dependence, and 
materiality to be used in analyzing a bias challenge and rejecting an arbitrator’s presence on 
the board of directors as a serious conflict of interest). See also Urbaser SA and Consorcio de 
Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic (2010) at para 
40 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (finding that opinions 
expressed in prior academic publications were not relevant enough to indicate a “manifest” 
lack of independence or impartiality).
27. Schefer, supra note 6 at 477. One source of apparent bias can be the nationality of 
the arbitrator.
28. In contrast, in the sister case AWG Group Limited v The Argentine Republic, which proceeded 
under the United Nations Committee on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) 
Arbitration Rules, the arbitrators concluded that disqualification was mandated where 
a reasonable and informed person would have “justifiable doubts” as to the arbitrator’s 
independence and impartiality. See AWG Group Limited v The Argentine Republic (2008) at 
para 24 (United Nations Committee on International Trade Law).
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B. ABSENCE OF AN APPEALS PROCESS
The second main cluster of concerns relates to the absence of an ICSID appeals 
process. Since its establishment, ICSID has offered an internal annulment 
procedure for vexatious outcomes. However, some ad hoc annulment committees 
have taken a broad view of their powers or have searched proactively for additional 
grounds of annulment not relied upon by the applicant, thus blurring the line 
between annulment and appeal. As a result, the risk that an ICSID award will 
be annulled may be greater than the risk that a non-ICSID award will be set 
aside by a domestic court.29 The interventionist character of ICSID annulment 
proceedings may be viewed favourably by some critics in comparison to set-aside 
proceedings under the 1958 New York Convention.30 However, annulment 
proceedings alone are incapable of responding to the wide variety of investment 
disputes and arbitral decisions. As such, many have criticized the annulment 
29. See Christoph Schreuer, “From ICSID Annulment to Appeal Half Way Down the Slippery 
Slope” (2011) 10:2 Law & Prac Int’l Courts & Trib 211.
30. Specifically, the creativity and flexibility of ICSID annulment committees in reaching 
beyond the strict language of Article 52 of the ICSID Convention stands in contrast to the 
“very limited grounds” on which awards may be set aside under the New York Convention. 
See J Anthony VanDuzer, Penelope Simons & Graham Mayeda, Integrating Sustainable 
Development into International Investment Agreements: A Guide for Developing Country 
Negotiators (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2013) at 442-44.
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procedure as insufficient,31 and several academics advocate for the introduction 
of an ICSID appellate body.32
Even when arbitrators have made errors in law, the lack of an ICSID appellate 
body has led to unpredictable standards and inconsistent decisions.33 Different ad 
hoc tribunals analyze factually similar cases and reach radically disparate results.34 
Tribunals in two Argentine cases, for example, reached virtually identical 
conclusions on the substantive treatment standards but came to diametrically 
opposed results on the question of whether Argentina was in a state of necessity 
during the relevant time period.35
31. See Dohyun Kim, “The Annulment Committee’s Role in Multiplying Inconsistency in 
ICSID Arbitration: The Need to Move Away from an Annulment-Based System” (2011) 
86:1 NYU L Rev 242; Christopher Smith, “The Appeal of ICSID Awards: How the AMINZ 
Appellate Mechanism Can Guide Reform of ICSID Procedure” (2013) 41:2 Ga J Int’l & 
Comp L 567. Smith further explains:
In the process of seeking rapid finality, developments specific to international investment 
arbitration have created two primary problems … . The first problem is the almost universal 
lack of a genuine appellate process that would allow parties to appeal awards resulting from 
the faulty legal reasoning of tribunals. Consequently, errant legal rulings made by arbitrators 
are not subject to any meaningful form of judicial review. Second, the lack of clear precedent 
creates additional uncertainty (ibid at 568).
32. See e.g. William H Knull, III & Noah D Rubins, “Betting the Farm on International 
Arbitration: Is it Time to Offer an Appeal Option?” (2000) 11:4 Am Rev Int’l Arb 531. 
But see Irene M Ten Cate, “International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review” 
(2012) 44:4 NYU J Int’l L & Pol 1109 (clarifying that the case for appellate review in 
investment arbitration only targets the law-making function, not error correction); Katharina 
Diel-Gligor, “Competing Regimes in International Investment Arbitration: Choice between 
the ICSID and Alternative Arbitral Systems” (2011) 22:4 Am Rev Int’l Arb 677 (asserting 
that ICSID’s lack of appeal process is a strength due to the narrowness of remedies and 
assumed finality).
33. See e.g. Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis,” supra note 3.
34. See Silvia Karina Fiezzoni, “The Challenge of UNASUR Member Countries to Replace 
ICSID Arbitration” (2011) 2:1 Beijing L Rev 134.
35. See CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic (2007) at paras 149-50 
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes); LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E 
Capital Corp, and LG&E International, Inc v Argentine Republic (2006) at para 267 
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes). For a detailed analysis of 
this divergence in the context of necessity, see Michael Waibel, “Two Worlds of Necessity 
in ICSID Arbitration: CMS and LG&E” (2007) 20:3 Leiden J Int’l L 637. See also Harout 
Samra, “Five Years Later: The CMS Award Placed in the Context of the Argentine Financial 
Crisis and the ICSID Arbitration Boom” (2007) 38:3 U Miami Inter-Am L Rev 667 at 693 
(describing the tribunal’s award as “an effort to prolong the final resolution”).
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C. LACK OF TRANSPARENCY
In law, transparency includes making information and procedures accessible 
to other parties and the public, holding decision makers accountable for their 
decisions, and providing avenues for criticism or complaints to be heard and 
redressed. In the area of investment, transparency discussions can focus on internal 
or external transparency. Internal transparency aims to improve investors’ and 
host states’ access to relevant information and to increase the foreseeability of the 
expected standards of behaviour through administrative efficiency and reciprocal 
policy awareness. External transparency refers to the openness of the investment 
system to outsiders. This is where a majority of the criticism of ICSID has fallen. 
Efforts are underway to increase the transparency of investment arbitration 
through public registration of disputes, public hearings, and publication of party 
submissions and awards, but reforms are not moving fast enough.36 Third-party 
participation in arbitrations remains a topic of controversy.37 While traditional 
arbitration is typically confidential and constrained to the parties in question, 
investor-state arbitration impacts a host of actors in addition to the parties, all 
of whom have a stake in the outcome. Consequently, more work must be done 
to implement external transparency and to mitigate its potential disadvantages, 
such as the impact on confidentiality, the compromise of procedural integrity, 
and the rise of potential conflicts of interest.38 Experts should also investigate 
effective methods of assessing transparency in the investment arbitration context.
36. See e.g. Daniel Barstow Magraw Jr & Niranjali Manel Amerasinghe, “Transparency and 
Public Participation in Investor-State Arbitration” (2009) 15:2 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 337; 
Mabel I Egonu, “Investor-State Arbitration Under ICSID: A Case for Presumption Against 
Confidentiality” (2007) 24:5 J Int’l Arb 479.
37. See Eugenia Levine, “Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The 
Implications of an Increase in Third-Party Participation” (2011) 29:1 Berkeley J Int’l L 
200 (tracing the rationale for third-party participation in dispute settlements as a means 
of increasing legitimacy and accountability); Barnali Choudhury, “Recapturing Public 
Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the 
Democratic Deficit?” (2008) 41:3 Vand J Transnat’l L 775 (positing that the efficacy of 
investment arbitration decisions on public interest issues is limited by the lack of public 
participation); J Anthony VanDuzer, “Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State 
Arbitration Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation” (2007) 52:4 McGill LJ 
681 (arguing that tribunals’ realization of greater openness will diminish the potency of the 
accountability critique).
38. See Joshua DH Karton, “A Conflict of Interests: Seeking a Way Forward on Publication of 
International Arbitral Awards” (2012) 28:3 Arb Int’l 447. Means of mitigation may include 
joint third party submissions, tighter schedules for timely disclosure, page and subject matter 
limits on amicus briefs, and exceptions for state secrets. See Magraw & Amerasinghe, supra 
note 36 at 356-59.
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D. COMPLEXITY AND COST
The fourth functional challenge to ICSID arbitration is the most straightforward: 
cost and complexity. The financial crisis in Argentina and several nationalizations 
by leftist governments in South America have spawned a burgeoning number of 
claims before ICSID, and some respondent nations have been unable to cope.39 
ICSID proceedings are difficult to manage and prohibitively expensive. Their 
cost and complexity exacerbate the economic struggles of respondent developing 
countries and impair these countries’ access to justice.40 Defending a case costs 
on average four and a half million dollars,41 and there are increasing pressures to 
hire expensive foreign law firms.42 In addition, travel costs to common arbitration 
venues like Washington and London are sometimes insurmountable.43 Finally, 
investors’ resources often dwarf those of respondent states: When Shell filed 
charges against Nicaragua, it had revenues sixty-two times the state’s gross 
national product.44
39. For in-depth discussions of the Argentine crisis and its interaction with ICSID, see 
Eric David Kasenetz, “Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: The Aftermath of 
Argentina’s State of Necessity and the Current Fight in the ICSID” (2010) 41:3 Geo Wash 
Int’l L Rev 709; William W Burke-White, “The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability 
Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System” (2008) 3:1 Asian J WTO & Int’l 
Health L & Pol’y 199; Charity L Goodman, “Unchartered Waters: Financial Crisis and 
Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina” (2007) 28:2 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 449.
40. See e.g. Trakman, “The ICSID Under Siege,” supra note 19 at 616. But see Diana Marie 
Wick, “The Counter-Productivity of ICSID Denunciation and Proposals for Change” (2012) 
11:2 J Int’l Bus & L 239 (alleging that ICSID arbitration is actually less expensive than 
UNCITRAL or the charges of other arbitral institutions).
41. Matthew Hodgson, “Counting the costs of investment treaty arbitration” (24 March 
2014), Global Arbitration Review, online: <www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/
Counting_the_costs_of_investment_treaty.pdf>. See also Matthew Hodgson, “Costs in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Case for Reform” (2014) 11:1 Transnat’l Disp Mgmt 1.
42. See e.g. Eric Gottwald, “Leveling the Playing Field: Is it Time for a Legal Assistance 
Center for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2007) 22:2 Am U 
Int’l L Rev 237.
43. Choosing the “seat” of arbitration is a strategic consideration and often stems from the 
leverage that one party to the dispute exerts over the other. As such, “friendly” procedural 
centres such as Washington, London, or New York receive the greatest amount of attention, 
requiring some parties to cross significant distances to attend.
44. Fiezzoni, supra note 34 at 136.
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II. REFORM OF ICSID: RESPONSES AND SOLUTIONS
Arbitration has numerous advantages over other alternative dispute resolution 
(“ADR”) processes, including the ability to predetermine which national 
or international law will govern the dispute,  codify the scope of the dispute 
resolution agreement, and agree how disputes will be adjudicated even before 
they arise.45 It may also be more effective at resolving disputes. One study found 
a success rate of 63 per cent for arbitration compared to less than 20 per cent for 
bilateral negotiation and mediation.46 Despite the lack of traditional enforcement, 
international investment arbitration is effective because of incentives to preserve 
the general legitimacy of international law and to avoid international reputation 
costs, which can be very steep in some circumstances.47 Successful arbitration 
nevertheless typically requires a distinctive blend of perceived legitimacy, award 
enforcement, and a delicate balance of power between the parties.48 Arbitrators, 
investors, and policy makers are conscious of this fact.49
ICSID has not been oblivious to the challenges described above and has 
taken some remedial action.50 In April 2006, ICSID implemented a number of 
reforms to its Rules and Regulations,51 including the introduction of Rule 37, 
which provides that a tribunal may admit, after consulting the direct parties, the 
brief of a non-disputing party as long as it addresses a matter within the scope 
45. Sedlak, supra note 16 at 170-71 (finding that the benefits of ICSID arbitration outweigh 
the limitations).
46. See Stephen E Gent & Megan Shannon, “The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and 
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind” (2010) 72:2 J Pol 366.
47. See Stephen E Gent, “The Politics of International Arbitration and Adjudication” (2013) 
2:1 Penn St JL & Int’l Aff 66 at 69-70. See generally George W Downs & Michael A Jones, 
“Reputation, Compliance, and International Law” (2002) 31:1 J Legal Stud S95.
48. For commentary on the challenges of the political aspect and its interaction with legal 
mechanisms, see Gent, supra note 47.
49. Ibid. Curiously, there appears to be a negative correlation between ICSID entry incentives of 
international political clout and domestic judicial capacity: The greater the former incentive, 
the weaker the latter (e.g., Brazil), and vice versa (e.g., Nicaragua).
50. In October 2004, the ICSID Secretariat prepared and released a discussion paper that 
identified two overriding issues: a lack of transparency in ICSID proceedings and a lack of 
public participation in and access to ICSID awards. However, the responses were wildly 
uneven, and the ICSID Secretariat lacks the legal authority to initiate substantial reform. See 
Trakman, “The ICSID Under Siege,” supra note 19 at 630-31.
51. For a thorough overview of the 2006 reforms, see Tuck, supra note 16 at 892-901.
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of the dispute.52 The amendments were the product of “18 months’ consultation 
with ICSID contracting states, the business community, civil society, arbitration 
experts and other arbitral institutions.”53
Two prominent scholars have been similarly inclined to encourage ICSID 
adjustment rather than overhaul and have recently voiced strong support for 
ICSID reform instead of replacement.54 Other proponents have joined in the 
chorus of optimism,55 and some have even claimed to provide preliminary 
evidence that the criticism of ICSID as biased is misplaced.56 Most critics remain 
wary of ICSID’s progress, however, and have pushed either for reform or for the 
consideration of alternatives. Certain suggestions for improvement and several 
alternatives will be discussed below.
A. IMPROVEMENTS: AN APPELLATE BODY AND BEYOND
One major recommendation to bolster ICSID’s effectiveness is the expansion 
or alteration of its annulment procedure. For some, this would entail the 
introduction of a full appellate body capable of an adapted form of judicial 
review.57 Others would be content with the annulment committees taking a more 
52. Nevertheless, the tribunal’s discretion is limited, and tribunals are likely to equate the need 
for a “sufficient interest” with requiring a “public interest.” In addition, the third party must 
bring “particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties.” 
Most seriously, a third party must not “unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party.” See 
Trakman, “The ICSID Under Siege,” supra note 19 at 633-34.
53. Tuck, supra note 16 at 892.
54. Sergio Puig, “Recasting ICSID’s Legitimacy Debate: Towards a Goal-Based Empirical 
Agenda” (2013) 36:2 Fordham Int’l LJ 465; Wick, supra note 40.
55. See e.g. Kristina Andelic, “Why ICSID Doesn’t Need an Appellate Procedure, and What to 
Do Instead” (2014) Transnat’l Disp Mgmt 1; Diel-Gligor, supra note 32.
56. See Susan D Franck, “The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration 
Awards” (2011) 51:4 Va J Int’l Law 825 (arguing that ICSID should minimize concerns 
about legitimacy and maximize opportunities for equality). Indeed, when controlling for 
energy disputes, Latin American respondents, and Development Status, the results indicated 
that there was no reliable statistical relationship between ICSID arbitrations and either 
amounts claimed or ultimate outcomes, and amounts claimed against Latin American states 
were higher but only for non-ICSID arbitration. Franck nevertheless urges appropriate 
caution about the finding given the size of the pre-2007 population and the presence of other 
studies claiming statistical significance.
57. See Johanna Kalb, “Creating an ICSID Appellate Body” (2005) 10:1 UCLA J Int’l L & 
Foreign Aff 179 (arguing that states should take steps towards ICSID reform as a way of 
preserving sovereignty and maximizing autonomy); Smith, supra note 31.
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active role.58 Ultimately, an appellate body would be a necessary, if not sufficient, 
condition for greater ICSID effectiveness in the future. Specifically, it would 
address concerns about the absence of an avenue to correct errors and would 
assist in building a system of precedent to increase certainty and predictability. 
An appellate body would also have indirect benefits, such as increased transparency 
and reduced perceptions of bias. One drawback would be a likely increase in 
complexity and cost.
While the conflict between confidentiality and transparency is another 
contentious aspect of investor-state arbitration, most scholars and practitioners 
agree that ICSID should continue its recent efforts to improve transparency and 
accountability, which include greater access to public hearings and disclosure 
of documents and awards.59 Similarly, some push for an expansion of ICSID’s 
jurisdiction to include “any plausibly economic asset or activity.”60 To enhance 
the legitimacy of international investment law, Stephan W. Schill recommends 
an expansion of public law thinking within the existing structure of investment 
treaty arbitration and a reconceptualization of international investment treaty 
arbitration as a public law discipline that transcends territorial borders.61
58. Tsai-Yu Lin, “Systemic Reflections on Argentina’s Non-Compliance with ICSID Arbitral 
Awards: A New Role of the Annulment Committee at Enforcement?” (2012) 5:1 Contemp 
Asia Arb J 1 at 20 (considering the impact of a more active role of the annulment committees 
by taking “inducement” effects into account in their decision making). See also David 
Collins, “ICSID Annulment Committee Appointments: Too Much Discretion for the 
Chairman?” (2013) 30:4 J Int’l Arb 333 (encouraging the adoption of a selection procedure 
similar to the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body).
59. See Amanda L Norris & Katina Z Metzidakis, “Public Protests, Private Contracts: 
Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitration and the Cochabamba Water War” (2010) 15:1 Harv 
Negot L Rev 31. Another recommendation is improving the constitution of ICSID panels 
through changes to arbitrator qualification. See Odumosu, supra note 10. But see Wick, 
supra note 40 at 283 (alleging that the alternative forums for investor-state arbitration are all 
less transparent than ICSID).
60. See Julian Davis Mortenson, “The Meaning of ‘Investment’: ICSID’s Travaux and the 
Domain of International Investment Law” (2010) 51:1 Harv Int’l LJ 257 (urging a 
reversal of the trend to curtail the categories of investment eligible for protection under the 
ICSID Convention).
61. “Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological 
Foundations of a New Public Law Approach” (2011) 52:1 Va J Int’l L 57. See also Schefer, 
supra note 6 at 454-73 (questioning whether the discretion to allow an amicus curiae 
submission should rest with the parties).
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B. ALTERNATIVES: DOMESTIC COURTS, MEDIATION, AND OTHER 
AVENUES
One alternative to ICSID is the use of domestic courts for investor-state disputes.62 
Proponents of this view presume that if investment arbitration privileges foreign 
investors, it undermines the national interest, and if it detracts from the national 
interest, it ought to be replaced by local courts.63 Domestic courts are subject 
to established procedural and evidential constraints in deciding cases, and their 
decisions are subject to appeal. Support for domestic courts over arbitrators is 
also grounded in economic efficiency.64
Australia endorsed this approach in 2011, when it issued a trade policy 
statement expressing the view that domestic courts, not investment tribunals, are 
the appropriate bodies to resolve investment disputes between states and foreign 
investors.65 The effect of this policy shift is that the Australian government may 
negotiate for investment disputes to be heard by domestic courts rather than by 
international investment arbitration tribunals. However, domestic litigation is 
also open to criticism:
62. See e.g. Thiago Braz Jardim Oliveira, “The Authority of Domestic Courts in Adjudicating 
International Investment Disputes: Beyond the Distinction Between Treaty and Contract 
Claims” (2013) 4:1 J Int’l Disp Settlement 175 (arguing that deference to international 
dispute settlement mechanisms is incompatible with dispute settlement clauses contained 
in investment treaties and contractual agreements that foresee a role to be played by 
domestic courts).
63. A third option in addition to ICSID and domestic courts, whereby foreign investors who 
feel their rights have been violated can seek diplomatic intervention by their home state, is 
conceivable but less frequently mentioned.
64. Trakman, “The ICSID Under Siege,” supra note 19 at 650.
65. Austl, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: 
Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity (12 April 2011), online: <blogs.usyd.edu.au/
japaneselaw/2011_Gillard%20Govt%20Trade%20Policy%20Statement.pdf>. While doubts 
about ICSID are not limited to Australia—and Australia’s stance towards investor-state 
arbitration is more moderate than that taken by Latin American states—Australia is the first 
developed state to openly indicate that it will no longer agree to the adoption of arbitration 
within its Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements. See Leon E Trakman, “Choosing 
Domestic Courts Over Investor-State Arbitration: Australia’s Repudiation of the Status 
Quo” (2012) 35:3 UNSWLJ 979 [Trakman, “Choosing Domestic Courts”]. But see Leon E 
Trakman, “Investor-State Arbitration: Evaluating Australia’s Evolving Position” (2014) 15:1 
J World Trade 152 (showing Australia’s retreat from its anti-investor-state arbitration stance 
in the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement concluded on 5 December 2013, discouraging 
the complete rejection of investor-state arbitration and reaffirming the challenges of domestic 
courts to resolve investor-state disputes).
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[P]oking metaphorical holes in [investor-state arbitration] is offset by debilitating 
holes in domestic courts attempting to resolve investor-state disputes transparently, 
even-handedly and in particular, consistently and fairly. Indeed, [investor-state 
arbitration] provisions in [bilateral investment treaties] provide a greater level of 
uniformity, predictability and security than resort to domestic courts.66
The wholesale embrace of domestic courts has other repercussions. If 
domestic courts have the final word on investor-state arbitration, domestic laws 
and interests are likely to further dilute international investment law and practice. 
Investors are highly skeptical of some domestic legal systems.67 Domestic courts 
do not ordinarily share tribunals’ expertise in international investment law,68 
and even with access to appeals, variations between countries may exacerbate 
inconsistency and uncertainty on the global scale. Therefore, while domestic 
courts undoubtedly have potential to sidestep the obstacles that ICSID has 
encountered, their success is unpredictable and they have undeniable drawbacks, 
leading us to look for solutions elsewhere.
Mediation is an underused tool in investor-state dispute resolution and may 
become a useful alternative to international investment arbitration in the future.69 
As discussed above, investment disputes have increased in number, complexity, 
cost, and duration. Today, the measures challenged cover a broad range of policy 
areas including tax, subsidies, and licenses and diverse sectors such as oil and gas, 
mining, tourism, public utilities, and communications. Mediation has several 
advantages over arbitration: lower costs, more flexible format, quicker time 
frames, enhanced party control over the process and outcome, and a greater space 
for creative agreements that incorporate non-legal and non-monetary interests.70
Other ADR tools receiving heightened attention include investment 
dispute detection, prevention, and management systems; early alert systems; 
and application of the “ombudsman model” to investment dispute settlement.71 
66. Trakman, “Choosing Domestic Courts,” supra note 65 at 984.
67. Odumosu, supra note 10 at 377.
68. Trakman, “The ICSID Under Siege,” supra note 19 at 653.
69. For an excellent discussion on mediation as a meaningful supplement to arbitration, see 
Nancy A Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, “The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2013) 18:1 Harv Negot L Rev 71.
70. See Silvia Constain, “Mediation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Government Policy 
and the Changing Landscape” (2013) 29:1 ICSID Rev 1. But see Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, 
“Mediation: The ‘New Arbitration’” (2012) 17:1 Harv Negot L Rev 61 at 61 (arguing that 
“the boundaries between mediation and arbitration are blurring”).
71. See Constain, supra note 70; Neville Melville, “Has Ombudsmania Reached South Africa? 
The Burgeoning Role of Ombudsmen in Commercial Dispute Resolution” (2010) 22:1 SA 
Mercantile LJ 50.
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Mediation will not likely overtake arbitration as the preferred method of addressing 
investor-state disputes in the near term, but the evolving investment environment 
provides a setting for its use and an opportunity for parties to take advantage of 
its benefits. A first step would be to establish explicit provisions encouraging the 
use of non-arbitration ADR in investor-state dispute settlement agreements.
III. THE LATIN AMERICAN REACTION: SUSPICION AND 
WITHDRAWAL
Developing countries have borne the brunt of ICSID’s shortcomings and have 
criticized its tepid reforms. Their displeasure has been expressed in widespread 
denunciation of ICSID. In Latin America in particular, there are signs of a 
backlash against ICSID, including award non-compliance, creation of public 
agencies, and withdrawal from the ICSID Convention. These adverse reactions 
are explored in greater detail in Parts III(A)–(C), below. Part III(D) situates 
these developments in a larger context and analyzes the varied Latin American 
responses through the lens of regional geopolitics.72
A. OVERT DISOBEDIENCE: NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ICSID AWARDS
Article 54 of the ICSID Convention states, “Each Contracting State shall 
recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce 
the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were 
a final judgment of a court in that State.”73
By contrast, Argentina contends that ICSID’s preferential treatment of 
foreign investors amounts to discrimination in violation of the Argentine 
Constitution’s principle of equality before the law.74 This view, known as the 
“Rosatti Doctrine,” named after a former Argentine Minister of Justice, holds 
that bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) and the ICSID Convention are 
subordinate to the Argentine Constitution and that awards should be reviewable 
72. This geopolitical context has additional impacts on the practical feasibility and shortcomings 
of both ICSID and the UNASUR Arbitration Centre, described in Part IV(A), below. 
Specifically, it comprises the second driving factor behind the main argument of this article 
(i.e., that a hybrid regime is both likely and desirable).
73. Supra note 6, art 54.
74. Katia Fach Gómez, “Latin America and ICSID: David versus Goliath?” (2011) 17:2 L & 
Bus Rev Am 195 at 201. But see generally Anibal Sabater, “The Weakness of the Rosatti 
Doctrine: Ten Reasons Why ICSID’s Standing Provisions Do Not Discriminate Against 
Local Investors” (2004) 15:3&4 Am Rev Int’l Arb 465; Bernardo M Cremades, “Resurgence 
of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America” (2006) 7:1 Bus L Int’l 53.
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by national courts.75 In Jose Cartellone Construcciones Civiles SA v Hidroelectrica 
Norpatagonica SA,76 the Argentine Supreme Court stressed that it may review 
arbitral awards if it finds the awards “unconstitutional, unreasonable or illegal,” 
even if the parties have waived their right to appeal.77
Bolivia and Ecuador have taken a similarly radical approach to eliminating 
perceived threats to their constitutional sovereignty and jurisdictional supremacy. 
Article 366 of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution states, “All foreign companies 
operating in the oil and gas sector are subject to the sovereignty of the State 
and under no circumstances will a foreign tribunal be recognized nor can 
international arbitration or diplomatic interventions be resorted to.”78 Article 
422 of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution prohibits the enactment of treaties 
or international instruments in which Ecuador cedes sovereign jurisdiction to 
international arbitration.79 In July 2010, the Ecuadorian Constitutional Tribunal 
declared a number of ICSID-related BITs unconstitutional on this basis.80
B. INSTITUTIONAL RESISTANCE: NATIONAL COURTS AND PUBLIC 
AGENCIES
On 15 June 2009, Venezuela’s Supreme Court issued a press release entitled 
“Venezuela’s Immunity against Foreign Courts is Consolidating,” in which it 
rejected the classical configuration of international investment arbitration.81 
Since then, Venezuela has pursued a policy of “preventive soaking,” in which 
the country’s willingness to submit disputes to “foreign courts” has dwindled 
significantly.82 By contrast, the state asserted that it is “absolutely sovereign,” 
and it is “only by consent of the highest authorities of the national power” that 
Venezuela will recognize international jurisdiction.83 Venezuela may also resort to 
75. Gómez, supra note 74 at 201, n 53.
76. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [Supreme Court], Buenos Aires, 1 June 
2004 (Argentina).
77. Gómez, supra note 74 at 201.
78. Ibid at 203.
79. Ibid. For a discussion on several dire implications of Ecuador’s new approach that also 
expresses skepticism about the faithful implementation of Article 422 and the potential loss 
of foreign direct investment, see Gillman, supra note 9 at 294-98.
80. Gómez, supra note 74 at 203.
81. Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [Supreme Court], “Se consolida la inmunidad de Venezuela 
frente a tribunals extranjeros” (15 June 2009), online: <eanzola.com/images/uploads/
Nota_de_Prensa_-_TSJ_-_15_junio_09.pdf> (Venezuela) [Tribunal Supremo de Justicia] 
[translated by author].
82. Ibid [translated by author].
83. Ibid [translated by author].
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an “internal test” argument, borrowed from Argentina, to effect non-compliance 
with any award ICSID renders against it.84 In other words, the submission of 
international arbitration disputes “must be approved by the President of Venezuela 
and the treaty ratified by the National Assembly; on the basis of sovereignty, the 
state may denounce or modify international treaties where Venezuela is subject 
to a foreign jurisdiction.”85 As a result, foreign investors may be confronted with 
a formidable shield between Venezuela and ICSID.
Another expression of Latin American institutional resistance is the creation 
of specialized public agencies to defend ICSID disputes. In April 2007, Nicaragua 
created the Interinstitutional Commission for the Defense of the Nicaraguan 
State against Investment Disputes.86 In June 2008, Bolivia created a new ministry 
responsible for the legal defence of investment arbitration claims.87 Its motto, 
translated, reads, “[T]he motherland is not for sale, but to be defended.”88 While 
these agencies may be seen as an implicit endorsement of ICSID arbitration, they 
also indicate, at the very least, a skepticism and distrust of the ICSID regime and, 
when seen in the context of other actions taken, a pattern of denunciation.
C. SYSTEMIC REJECTION: BITS, RESOURCE NATIONALISM, AND 
CONVENTION WITHDRAWAL
Some Latin American countries have shifted towards a policy of resource 
nationalism,89 placing natural resources, particularly oil, under the control 
of national companies. The president of Bolivia approved the nationalization 
of mining and other sectors in 2006 even though Bolivia’s nationalization 
of the hydrocarbons sector in the last century had been harshly reviewed.90 
Venezuela followed a similar approach, signing cooperation and integration 
agreements within Latin America and adopting new Terms and Conditions 
84. Gómez, supra note 74 at 205. See e.g. Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic 
(2010) (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes).
85. Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, supra note 81 [translated by author].
86. Gómez, supra note 74 at 221.
87. Ibid at 222.
88. Ibid.
89. For a broader use of this term in the Latin American energy context, see Jason Pierce, “A 
South American Energy Treaty: How the Region Might Attract Foreign Investment in a 
Wake of Resource Nationalism” (2011) 44:2 Cornell Int’l LJ 417.
90. Gómez, supra note 74 at 206. After the nationalization, foreign companies were forced 
to negotiate new, less profitable contracts that eliminated ICSID arbitration as a recourse 
and under which they would pay up to eighty-two per cent of profits to the state in taxes. 
Reasons for the nationalization included regionalism, economic defence, and political 
messaging, all of which are discussed further in Part III(D), below.
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for the Establishment and Operation of Mixed Enterprises that stressed that 
the Venezuelan courts, not international arbitrators, are the competent venues 
for dispute resolution.91 Whether declining oil prices will cause a retreat from 
resource nationalism or broader regional approaches will take a firm and lasting 
hold remains to be seen.92
Latin American countries have also begun to use BITs as a means to 
combat ICSID by (1) introducing new BITs that contain an option to choose 
between ICSID and ad hoc arbitration under United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) rules, (2) terminating existing 
BITs, and (3) developing new model BITs. The first approach has been used by 
Paraguay, Colombia, Peru, and other countries in multiple BITs with China, 
Japan, and European countries since 2005.93 The second approach has been 
used by Venezuela and Ecuador, with the former terminating its BIT with the 
Netherlands in 2008 and the latter terminating BITs with as many as thirteen 
countries.94 The third approach may be illustrated by Colombia’s 2007 BIT 
Model. This model establishes a fork in the road between national courts and 
international arbitration and does not include an umbrella clause that precludes 
a breach of contract between a state and foreign investor from becoming a 
breach of the BIT.95
91. Ibid at 206-207.
92. After considerable fluctuation throughout 2014 and early 2015, oil prices have remained 
steady since April 2015; however, bailout talks with Greece and a nuclear deal with Iran 
have introduced new uncertainty and downward pressure despite expectations of typical 
summer demand. See Timothy Puko, “Oil Prices Pare Losses to End Flat: Expectations for 
summer demand limit fears surrounding Greek bailout and Iran’s nuclear talks,” The Wall 
Street Journal (26 June 2015), online: <www.wsj.com/articles/oil-prices-fall-on-concerns-
about-greek-bailout-and-iran-nuclear-deals-1435309493>. The long-term impact, if any, on 
resource nationalism in Latin America and elsewhere has yet to be seen.
93. Gómez, supra note 74 at 213-14.
94. These countries include Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania, and Uruguay. Furthermore, the Ecuadorian 
National Assembly approved BIT termination with Finland, Sweden, France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom and is considering BIT termination with Argentina, Bolivia, 
Canada, Italy, Peru, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. See Francisco X Jijón, 
“Ecuador Evaluates Investment Treaty Framework,” online: <www.latinarbitrationlaw.com/
ecuador-evaluates-investment-treaty-framework>.
95. Gómez, supra note 74 at 220.
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The most dramatic form of Latin American denunciation of ICSID is 
withdrawal from the ICSID Convention.96 An exit from the global forum signals 
countries’ terminal loss of faith in the system and raises questions about ICSID’s 
fitness for purpose.97 For a period of time, it appeared as if the statements made 
by Latin American governments, no matter how vilifying, were empty threats. 
In May 2007, however, the World Bank received written notice of Bolivia’s 
denunciation of the ICSID Convention. The denunciation took effect six months 
after receipt, in November 2007.98
Ecuador at first sought a partial escape from ICSID by invoking Article 
25(4) of the ICSID Convention, which provides for the exclusion of “‘differences 
arising on matters concerning the treatment of an investment, resulting from 
economic activities concerning the use of natural resources such as oil, gas, 
minerals or other[s] … .’”99 Almost two years later, Ecuador notified the World 
Bank of its withdrawal from the ICSID Convention. The withdrawal was decided 
in an Ecuadorian Executive Decree and took effect on 7 January 2010. Finally, 
in January 2012, Venezuela gave notice of its intent to withdraw from the ICSID 
Convention,100 making it the third Latin American state to file for divorce from 
ICSID in barely five years.
96. Unfortunately, there are contradictory interpretations of the ICSID Convention’s provisions 
on denunciation as to whether the denouncing state remains bound only to disputes 
initiated before the denunciation (the “theory of offer to consent”) or to future disputes 
(providing that the state’s consent to ICSID arbitration exists in that country’s BIT) (the 
“theory of consent”). Under the latter interpretation, states must separately terminate 
all BITs that contain an ICSID arbitration option, and exposure to ICSID proceedings 
will persist throughout the period dictated by the BIT’s survival clause. See Cesare PR 
Romano, “The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International 
Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent” (2007) 39:4 NYU J Int’l L & Pol 791; 
Gaillard, supra note 3.
97. Sergey Ripinsky, “Venezuela’s Withdrawal From ICSID: What it Does and Does Not 
Achieve” (13 April 2012), International Institute for Sustainable Development, online:  
<www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does- 
not-achieve>.
98. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, News Release, “Bolivia 
Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention” (16 May 2007), online: <icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/Announcement3.html>.
99. Gómez, supra note 74 at 211.
100. See Elizabeth Eljuri & Ramón J Alvins S, “Venezuela denounces the ICSID Convention” 
(January 2012), online: <www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/venezuela-denounces-the-icsid-
convention-pdf-92kb-62432.pdf>. The withdrawal took effect in July 2012.
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D. STRATEGIC SIGNALLING: THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS
States have multiple avenues to settle disputes, from bilateral negotiations to 
non-binding mediation to military conflict. They must forego other options when 
choosing arbitration, whether at ICSID or under the aegis of a regional body such 
as UNASUR. There are two primary reasons for developing countries to agree 
to BITs involving international investment arbitration. The first is the pursuit of 
economic self-interest: In addition to investment in-flows,101 BITs enable a host 
country to leverage the power of a resource group and to extract greater value 
from the investment without traditional legal or contractual enforcement.102
Second, developing countries may use arbitration strategies as an 
opportunity to engage in political messaging or to signal discontent that is 
separate from the shortcomings of the investment system itself.103 On some level, 
the Latin American reaction to ICSID represents an ideological challenge to 
trade liberalism. The “engine of ideology” can be seen clearly when examining 
individual states’ responses to ICSID since 2005.104 Bolivia and Ecuador, the 
most radical of the ICSID-hostile countries, have led the charge towards ICSID 
denunciation. Most notably, these two countries have withdrawn from the ICSID 
Convention along with Venezuela. As discussed above, Bolivia and Ecuador have 
taken dramatic steps—in the form of constitutional amendments—to distance 
themselves from international arbitration jurisdiction. Finally, Ecuador and 
101. See generally A Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant 
Law in the Global Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
102. See Andrew T Guzman, “Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the 
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties” (1998) 38:4 Va J Int’l L 639 at 644. Guzman 
explains the BIT explosion by inferring that BITs provide potential investors with protections 
that are superior, in all forms of investor-host conflicts, to those of customary international 
law by allowing them to negotiate for whatever protections and safeguards they feel are 
needed. However, although BITs improve the efficiency of foreign investment, they may not 
increase the welfare of developing countries, as the “group gains” are relatively modest and 
are often outweighed by “bid losses” suffered by the countries due to competition for further 
investment (ibid at 688).
103. See generally Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006) (untangling how politics, ideology, and 
economics drive the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to do what they do and 
learn or fail to learn from those choices).
104. For a preliminary and forward-looking discussion with emphasis on the ideological 
component prior to UNASUR entering into force, see Ignacio A Vincentelli, “The Uncertain 
Future of ICSID in Latin America” (2010) 16:3 L & Bus Rev Am 409. Vincentelli 
states that “[i]f, moved by the engine of ideology, the rest of Latin America follows the 
example of Bolivia and Ecuador … the future of ICSID in Latin America becomes 
uncertain” (ibid at 411).
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Venezuela have terminated the highest number of BITs compared to their Latin 
American counterparts.
In contrast, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru, among others, have chosen to 
pursue their interests from a position of compromise: by drafting new BITs or by 
pushing for greater flexibility within existing BITs. This simultaneous antagonism 
towards and embrace of the international arbitration regime splits Latin America 
along ideological lines. Policy makers must recognize these realities and the 
impact of their underlying ideological agendas on the long-term viability of any 
international arbitration system. These considerations must therefore be kept in 
mind when assessing the UNASUR Arbitration Centre as a regional alternative, 
a task to which this article now turns.
IV. THE PROMISE OF UNASUR: RECOGNITION AND RELIEF
Frustration with ICSID has left Latin America in a state of transition when it 
comes to resolving international investment disputes. Dozens of BITs still exist 
and ICSID still plays a predominant role in the region, but the search for a 
permanent alternative that addresses Latin America’s complaints has become ever 
more urgent. Part IV focuses on the most promising of the alternatives proposed, 
a regional arbitration centre within UNASUR, analyzing its potential strengths 
and describing the weaknesses that must be overcome for it to arrive at a place of 
serious legitimacy.
A. OVERVIEW OF ECUADOR’S PROPOSAL105
The Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR was signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela on 23 May 2008106 and entered into force on 11 March 2011.107 
In June 2009, at the thirty-ninth Session of the General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States, Ecuador’s Foreign Minister suggested the 
creation of a UNASUR arbitration centre as a forum for resolving international 
105. Due to the lack of English translations of UNASUR’s rules of operation and other primary 
documents, including the Ecuadorean proposal for a UNASUR arbitration centre, this 
account relies heavily on Fiezzoni’s article for the texts and histories of these documents. See 
Fiezzoni, supra note 34.
106. “South American Union of Nations Constitutive Treaty” (2009) 15:2 Law & 
Bus Rev Am 465. 
107. Fiezzoni, supra note 34 at 140. UNASUR is the first regional organization to comprise most 
South American countries. Five of the twelve UNASUR countries currently face fifty-three 
cases before ICSID, which represents almost 25 per cent of the total caseload.
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investment disputes. In December 2010, Ecuador submitted a proposal for 
the arbitration centre’s dispute settlement system. At that meeting, the foreign 
ministers of the UNASUR member countries unanimously agreed that Ecuador 
should chair the associated working group.108
The Ecuadorian proposal consisted of three elements: (1) a set of rules of 
operation (the “Rules”) for an Arbitration Centre (the “Arbitration Centre”), 
(2) a code of conduct for UNASUR arbitrators, and (3) a “Counseling Centre 
of Investment Disputes”109 (“Counseling Centre”). The Board of the Arbitration 
Centre was to be made up of representatives of member states, with the country 
holding the Presidency Pro-Tempore of UNASUR also acting as chair of 
the Board.110 The Rules provide for the settlement of disputes between states 
and between a state and investor by virtue of any provision in a contract or 
international instrument.111
As a precondition for arbitration, member states may require applicants to 
exhaust all domestic remedies. In circumstances where the claim arises in relation 
to a state’s administrative actions, local remedies must always be exhausted first.112 
The parties must attempt to resolve a dispute by consultation within six months 
from the date of filing the request, unless the parties agree otherwise.113 By mutual 
agreement, the parties may proceed directly to mediation.114 Under Article 5, the 
mediation is closed (1) when the parties sign a settlement agreement, (2) by 
written decision of any party at any time after attendance at the first meeting, or 
(3) by decision of the mediator where the continuation of mediation is unlikely 
to settle the dispute.115 Under Article 6, the member state of the investor may 
initiate a mediation process.116 However, in the case of an investor-state dispute, 
the investor must notify the respondent state before it initiates the process.117
Article 19 establishes the exclusivity of the Arbitration Centre. As such, when 
parties submit a dispute to the Arbitration Centre, they renounce the use of all 




111. Ibid (Article 2).
112. Ibid (Article 3).
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid (Article 4).
115. Ibid at 140.
116. Ibid at 140-41.
117. Ibid at 140.
118. Ibid at 141.
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all aspects of an arbitration, including all documents, records, evidence, hearings, 
and awards, will be publicly accessible, except for those relating to defence and 
national security and special cases determined by mutual consent of the parties.119
The tribunal generally will be composed of three arbitrators. Each party 
appoints one arbitrator, and both parties designate the tribunal’s president and 
substitute by mutual agreement. If there is no agreement on the selection of 
the president, the General Director of the Arbitration Centre will designate him 
or her by lot.120
In line with UNCITRAL121 and Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration122 Rules, Article 3 provides that an arbitrator must disclose any 
“‘interest, relation or issue that may affect the independence or impartiality or 
that might reasonably create an impression of dishonesty or unfair behavior 
in the process.’”123 In this context, independence is an objective test focused 
on the absence or existence of identifiable relationships with any party to the 
proceedings, whereas impartiality is a subjective test examining the likelihood 
that an arbitrator will favour one side in the dispute.124 To support this objective, 
Article 6 prohibits former arbitrators from commenting publicly on cases 
analogous to those that they previously decided.125
Any party may challenge an arbitrator’s appointment under any 
circumstances that give rise to justifiable doubt about the arbitrator’s impartiality, 
independence, or overall compliance with the Code of Conduct.126 Within five 
days of the challenge, the disputing parties may agree to accept the challenge, in 
which case the challenged arbitrator will resign. If there is no agreement between 
the parties, the General Director will decide the recusal.127
Regarding amicus curiae, or third party intervention, the tribunal may 
receive unsolicited letters from individuals or other legal entities established in 
119. Ibid (Articles 23 and 26)
120. Ibid at 141 (Article 9). The general appointment process under UNASUR does not deviate 
significantly from ICSID.
121. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, “UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
(as revised in 2010)” (April 2011), online: <www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/
arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf>.
122. Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, “2010 Arbitration Rules” 
(1 January 2010), online: <www.sccinstitute.com/media/40120/arbitrationrules_eng_
webbversion.pdf >.
123. Fiezzoni, supra note 34 at 142.
124. Ibid (Article 5).
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid at 141.
127. Ibid (Article 10).
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the territory of the parties, unless the parties agree otherwise.128 The letters must 
be concise, address issues relevant to matters of fact and law submitted for the 
tribunal’s consideration, and be received within ten days from the date of the 
tribunal’s confirmation.129
During the proceedings, if any party determines that an arbitrator should be 
replaced for failing to meet the requirements of the Code of Conduct, that party 
must notify the other party within fifteen days from first becoming cognizant of 
the violation.130 If the arbitrator is not the tribunal’s president, the parties may 
agree to elect a replacement pursuant to the normal election procedure. If the 
parties fail to reach agreement, they must request that the president make the 
final decision.131 If the president does not meet the requirements of the Code of 
Conduct, either party may request that one member on the list of arbitrators, 
chosen by lot, decide the matter. If this arbitrator decides against the president 
of the tribunal, the arbitrator must choose a new president by lot.132 To avoid 
inconsistency and promote predictability, all awards are to be published and 
have precedential value.133 Under Article 22, the arbitral tribunal is required 
to consolidate multiple proceedings with common questions of fact or law.134 
 The tribunal has 240 days to decide the dispute, with a possible extension of up 
to 120 days with the mutual agreement of the parties.135 
With the exception of a civil or economic emergency, parties are required 
to comply with an award immediately or within a mutually agreed upon time 
frame.136 Under Article 47, the only basis for refusing to enforce an award is that 
the subject of the dispute is not arbitrable or is contrary to public policy.137 Where 
the award is not honoured, the matter is returned to the original tribunal that 
heard the dispute. Where the state does not comply with an award, the investor’s 
home state may temporarily suspend obligations owed to the host state. Such 
suspension must be proportional to the degree of non-compliance.138
128. Ibid. 
129. Ibid (Article 35).
130. Ibid. 
131. Ibid. 
132. Ibid (Article 12).
133. Ibid (Articles 21 and 26).
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid (Article 41).
136. Ibid at 142 (Article 46).
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid (Article 49).
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Awards may be challenged by rectification, annulment, and appellation. 
Annulment may be sought on grounds similar to ICSID, namely that (1) the 
tribunal was not properly constituted, (2) the tribunal manifestly exceeded its 
powers, (3) a tribunal member was corrupt, (4) there was a serious departure 
from a fundamental rule of procedure, or (5) the award did not state the reasons 
upon which it was based.139 Where an award is submitted for appellate review 
of questions of law, an appellate tribunal will decide by consensus.140 Eight 
arbitrators constitute the pool for the appellate tribunal, which is comprised of 
three arbitrators for any given case.141 Both annulment applications and appeals 
must be decided within sixty days of the constitution of the respective tribunal.142
The Arbitration Centre’s jurisdiction excludes disputes concerning education, 
energy, health, taxation, and the environment unless expressly stated otherwise 
in the relevant contract or treaty. Under no circumstances will an arbitral 
tribunal have jurisdiction to resolve disputes with respect to the internal laws of 
a UNASUR member state.143
Pursuant to Article 2, the Counseling Centre is responsible for engaging 
in research, developing specialized studies, and providing technical assistance, 
legal guidance, and legal representation in investment disputes.144 If a conflict of 
interest arises in which the antagonistic parties are members of UNASUR and 
the Arbitration Centre, the Arbitration Centre is disqualified from providing its 
services.145 Both the Arbitration Centre and the Counseling Centre are limited to 
UNASUR members for the first three years. For the next three years, they will be 
open to other Latin American countries. After six years, the Arbitration Centre 
and Counseling Centre will be open to all countries.146
B. STRENGTHS AND BENEFITS
Ecuador’s proposal addresses all four of the concerns raised in Part I of this 
article: ideological and procedural bias, absence of an appeals process, lack of 
transparency, and complexity and cost. First, the arbitrator disqualification 
139. Ibid at 141-42.
140. Ibid at 142. The appellate dimension of UNASUR is one of the most important 
distinctions from the current ICSID structure, especially given the challenges outlined in 
Part I(B), above.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid (Articles 42, 44).
143. Ibid at 140.
144. Ibid at 142.
145. Ibid (Article 3).
146. Ibid.
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process alleviates ideological and procedural bias by closely mirroring the 
International Chamber of Commerce and Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration Rules. It also improves arbitrator regulation through the addition of 
selection by lot.147 While ICSID’s rules simply require disclosure of conflicts of 
interest, UNASUR’s requirements of independent judgment raise the standard 
to the likelihood of prejudgment or anything that “‘might reasonably create 
an impression of dishonest or unfair behavior … .’”148 This approach does not 
remove concerns with respect to arbitration’s lack of institutional safeguards of 
judicial independence (especially security of tenure and financial security in the 
form of a set salary from the state) nor address the lack of prohibitions of side 
work as a lawyer that may create conflicts of interest with cases heard by an 
arbitrator.149 However, UNASUR’s process and its higher subjective standards 
assist in addressing the issue of bias.
Second, the establishment of an appeal mechanism and a system of precedent 
accrues further benefits. The resulting consistency of jurisprudence would create 
predictability and enhance the legitimacy of the investment arbitration system. 
Third, the rules on transparency, providing exceptions only for national 
security and special cases, are consistent with the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) arbitration framework150 and would foster 
greater openness and democratic initiative. The enforcement limitations for 
non-arbitrable subjects or on grounds of public policy mimic the New York 
Convention and most international arbitration rules apart from ICSID’s.
Fourth, Latin American countries could take advantage of the cost efficiencies 
associated with the Arbitration Centre. For example, the Arbitration Centre’s use 
would eliminate the excessive expense of travelling to London or Washington for 
investment disputes. 
147. Ibid at 141.
148. Ibid at 142.
149. See e.g. Gus Van Harten, “Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the 
Rule of Law” in Stephan W Schill, ed, International Investment Law and Comparative 
Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 627; Gus Van Harten, “A Case for an 
International Investment Court” (2008) Society of International Economic Law Working 
Paper No 22/08, online: <www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/wp-content/uploads/
International-Arbitration-Doctrine-60international_arbitration.pdf>; Ruth Mackenzie 
& Philippe Sands, “International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the 
International Judge” (2003) 44:1 Harv Int’l LJ 271. A related concern would be finding an 
objective method for case assignment.
150. NAFTA Secretariat, “Dispute Settlement” (2014), online: <www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/
Dispute-Settlement>.
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Finally, the rollout implementation strategy and the integration of 
consultation and mediation opportunities prior to arbitration are creative 
approaches that appear to have few downsides.151 The influence of the World 
Trade Organization’s dispute settlement system regarding the consultation stage, 
appellate proceedings, and award compliance is constructive,152 and the common 
political will of UNASUR member countries to establish the Arbitration Centre 
speaks to the depth of their commitment.
C. POTENTIAL OBSTACLES
Although UNASUR’s Arbitration Centre has many benefits that address ICSID’s 
four major shortcomings, it nonetheless suffers from a number of obstacles. One 
immediate caveat is that it is untested. The remaining obstacles can be divided 
into three categories: practical calibrations,153 perceived insulation, and overall 
lack of cohesion.
First, UNASUR’s Arbitration Centre will have to overcome some technical 
hurdles by fine-tuning its proposed scheme and rules. For example, the 
requirement to exhaust domestic remedies could force injured parties to wait 
for years before they may apply to the Arbitration Centre. Undeniably, there are 
good reasons for this precondition, including economic, legal, and precedential 
considerations, and UNASUR member countries must be cautious to develop 
a clear and concrete framework that advises countries on their responsibilities 
and settlement recourses at various points in a dispute. Although the Arbitration 
Centre’s scope of action would be significantly enlarged compared to ICSID, 
its jurisdictional exclusions considerably reduce its competence over matters 
connected with commerce.154 Moreover, it will be impossible to eliminate forum 
shopping entirely, as the investor cannot prohibit its shareholders from suing in 
another forum.155
In addition, the rollout implementation model may result in a perception 
of regional insulation. Some critics believe that the main flaw of UNASUR is its 
attempt to supply a regional ideological retort to US hegemony.156 ICSID and 
151. The major downside (i.e., perceived insulation) is discussed in Part IV(C), below.
152. The World Trade Organization’s compliance levels are fairly high. See Fiezzoni, supra 
note 34 at 143.
153. Several recommendations to achieve these necessary adjustments will be proposed in 
Part IV(D), below.
154. Fiezzoni, supra note 34 at 140.
155. Ibid at 141.
156. Carola Ramón-Berjano, “UNASUR: When Thinking Big Is Not Necessarily the Best” 
Regions Magazine 281:1 (28 February 2011) 16 at 16.
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UNCITRAL are universal, if imbalanced, forums for international investment 
arbitration. If investors view UNASUR’s Arbitration Centre as a mere regional 
consortium or as an improper venue,157 they might reject it wholesale as a 
second-tier example of NAFTA with developing countries at the forefront. 
Admittedly, global respect for Brazil as an economic powerhouse may suppress 
these impressions, but the risks remain. Any such forum, whether regional or 
global, will also carry risks of political interference, especially in the absence of 
conventional elements of judicial independence.
A third potential obstacle is UNASUR’s lack of cohesion. The model to 
which UNASUR compares itself is far from perfect: Despite strong beginnings, 
the European Union has difficulty generating consensus among and distributing 
benefits to its member countries. Prioritizing the expansion over the deepening of 
the European Union has resulted in crisis. Similarly, a wide spectrum of economic 
policy differences exists among Latin American countries; Colombia and 
Mexico favour free trade while Venezuela and Bolivia are more protectionist.158 
It is arguable that historic rivalries between Brazil and Argentina or territorial 
disputes between Chile, Ecuador, and Peru will never truly disappear. Given 
the relative lack of resources in Latin America, it is arguably not worthwhile 
to channel them towards additional bureaucracy. Finally, the political mood on 
the continent is quite unruly, and new governments could radically change the 
diplomatic configuration.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
Ecuador’s proposed arbitration centre has adequate promise to remain a part of 
the discussion on how to resolve international investment disputes. However, 
policy makers must address the shortcomings highlighted above, particularly 
independence, fairness, openness, and a proper balance between investor 
protection and regulatory flexibility. UNASUR must work to ensure that investors 
see the Arbitration Centre as a viable venue for arbitration. This section makes 
several recommendations to enhance the potential of the UNASUR Arbitration 
Centre to play a constructive role in the international investment system. 
157. Mariano Tobías has a pessimistic outlook, stating that the Arbitration Centre 
is “doomed to fail” because investors will not consider the forum to be an 
impartial venue to resolve an eventual dispute. See Mariano Tobías, “Investment 
Arbitration and Latin America: Irreconcilable Differences?” (21 May 2013), Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog (blog), online: <kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/05/21/
investment-arbitration-and-latin-america-irreconcilable-differences>.
158. Ramón-Berjano, supra note 156 at 16.
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First, ensuring the high academic and professional qualifications of the 
arbitrators, as well as their independence and impartiality in practice, will be 
essential to the success and longevity of the proposed Arbitration Centre. To 
enhance arbitrator independence, the Arbitration Centre should cap arbitrators’ 
fees and impose a binding cooling-off period of three years post-service, during 
which arbitrators may not work as counsel or experts in investment cases.159 
Second, obstacles to arbitration should be lowered by relaxing the limitations on 
the scope of jurisdiction and setting a reasonable time limit for the exhaustion 
of domestic judicial remedies.160 Third, public accountability and participation 
should be enhanced by, among other things, extending the ten-day limit on 
amicus curiae until the submission of the allegations.161 To strike a more effective 
balance between transparency and confidentiality, parties should have the right to 
request confidentiality for documents containing corporate secrets.162 
Fourth, the consultation stage should be mandatory only for state-state 
disputes because parties to investor-state disputes do not have equal negotiating 
leverage and would benefit from the intervention of a mediator or arbitrator.163 
Fifth, consolidation of multiple proceedings should follow the NAFTA Rules in 
permitting a case-by-case feasibility evaluation.164 Sixth, the Arbitration Centre 
should be creative in its structure and availability: Submitting to arbitration 
rulings for a series of smaller issues poses less of a risk to disputants than a 
comprehensive ruling, as it provides the ability to back out at various stages. This 
flexibility would encourage disputants to consider the Arbitration Centre for a 
“trial run” where they would otherwise be disinclined.
Moving to broader systemic considerations, arbitration will be most effective 
when it reflects the political realities on the ground and produces settlements 
that do the same. As a result, foreign investment participants worldwide will be 
best served by a hybrid system that includes both ICSID and regional arbitration 
forums such as the UNASUR Arbitration Centre. This hybrid system will preserve 
investment liberalization, which is attractive for developed states, and a regional 
159. These suggestions would be equally applicable to UNASUR member states negotiating terms 
of investment treaties under other frameworks. Treaties should also encompass obligations to 
conduct environmental and human rights impact assessments and to comply with laws on 
health, labour, and taxation.
160. Fiezzoni, supra note 34 at 140.
161. Ibid at 141.
162. Ibid.
163. Ibid at 140.
164. Ibid at 141.
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alternative, which is attractive for developing states.165 A similar desire for flexibility 
and the need to find agreement over complex multidimensional issues supports 
the usefulness of a hybrid system, which would allow the UNASUR Arbitration 
Centre to handle region-specific disputes or disputes between accepting countries 
and ICSID to remain in place when non-accepting countries are involved. This 
hybrid regime also recognizes the complex political undercurrents in regions such 
as Latin America and provides a more robust framework as local and national 
governments inevitably change over time.
One possible counter-argument is that such a hybrid system would create 
the perception of a two-tier regime for international investment arbitration. 
However, this criticism can be discounted. First, the hybrid system need not 
reflect a dichotomy between developing and developed states. UNASUR should 
take steps to frame the Arbitration Centre as a legitimate alternative for all 
countries and to encourage global participation in the Arbitration Centre and 
other regional alternatives if and when they arise. Second, even if the perception 
of a two-tier system is accurate, the flexibility, comprehensiveness, and other 
benefits of a hybrid regime make the trade-off worthwhile.
Another potential counter-argument is that a hybrid system is in the interest 
of neither developed nor developing countries. According to this view, developed 
countries have an interest in enforcing ICSID alone on efficiency grounds while 
developing countries have an interest in “getting on board” with ICSID to gain 
greater access to capital. However, if the Arbitration Centre is viewed as a dispute 
resolution alternative of mutual benefit, developing states should feel empowered, 
not hindered, by promoting its use. Developed states might be more of a tough 
sell. But, as the Arbitration Centre establishes itself and proves it can fill a niche 
within international investment law, developed states will be motivated to agree 
to its use as an alternative arbitration forum.
The UNASUR Arbitration Centre can be an alternative forum for investment 
dispute resolution, but it must offer a legitimate alternative. ICSID is costly; the 
Arbitration Centre must be at least marginally affordable. ICSID is beholden 
to those with power; the Arbitration Centre must accommodate those without. 
ICSID works with the present; the Arbitration Centre must operate in the future. 
ICSID is driven by commercial interests; the Arbitration Centre must promote 
165. Catharine Titi, “Investment Arbitration in Latin America: The Uncertain Veracity of 
Preconceived Ideas” (2014) 30:2 Arb Int’l 357 (arguing that there is no single Latin 
American approach to investment arbitration and that the region should not be considered as 
particularly hostile to it, as such a characterization fails to capture the complex nuances of the 
relationship between Latin America and the investor-state dispute resolution mechanism).
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the interests of justice and society. The Arbitration Centre should seek to inspire 
a root-and-branch review of the patterns in international investment arbitration 
and instill confidence in developing countries to regain some of the clout that has 
been thereby forfeited.
V. CONCLUSION
The system surrounding international investment law has undergone significant 
change over the past decade: the number of arbitration cases has skyrocketed; 
ICSID has come under increasing scrutiny; new strategies, such as mediation, are 
gaining ground; and non-ICSID alternatives have been proposed and developed. 
The gap between ICSID and its critics is widening. A Latin American apparition 
lurking in the waters is steadily making its way towards land, upsetting the 
stability of a lucrative industry built on illusions of neutrality. Brazil’s rise, coupled 
with the diminished influence of the United States and the progressively salient 
global role of China, has reshuffled the kaleidoscope of regional allegiances in 
the Americas. Emerging counterweights, competing asymmetries, and shifting 
fault lines have had grave repercussions that threaten an economic earthquake of 
mammoth proportions.
Although its task is formidable, the UNASUR Arbitration Centre, with 
its singular ambition and the chance to learn from projects like Mercosur, has 
crucial prospects for investors, states, and scholars alike. Michael Shifter explains:
It is tempting to be skeptical about the proliferation of these crosscutting and often 
overlapping mechanisms … It is hard to know whether they will be able to sustain 
and strengthen their efforts, or will, with time, simply fade into the background. Even 
so, it would be a mistake to ignore or dismiss the rich institutional experimentation 
under way and the new regional architecture that is taking shape.166
This article has taken steps not to “ignore or dismiss” but to engage critically 
with one form of Latin America’s “rich institutional experimentation.”167 The 
system of international investment arbitration in Latin America and beyond is 
no longer on the “eve of a drastic change,”168 but it is evolving quickly in the 
direction of a hybrid regime. Looking forward, it is expected that ICSID will 
166. “The Shifting Landscape of Latin American Regionalism” (2012) 111:742 
Curr Hist 56 at 56.
167. Ibid.
168. Vincentelli, supra note 104 at 411.
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continue to retain a stronghold, although its mantle as the dominant forum for 
investment arbitration may have been shaken.169
Latin America, in particular, will see a distinct fusion of arbitration 
methodologies. The emergence of this hybrid system, comprised of both ICSID 
arbitration and regional alternatives such as the UNASUR Arbitration Centre, 
is both likely and desirable. It will be useful in addressing the problems that 
continue to plague ICSID. The hybrid system will also satisfy international 
investment participants; advance the goals of investment liberalization, which 
is desirable for developed states; and, more importantly for Latin America and 
other developing states, allow for regional cooperation and collaboration in some 
disputes, which will mean cost efficiencies, reduced perceptions of bias, and 
an overall sense of ownership. The UNASUR Arbitration Centre may not be 
faultless in addressing ICSID’s shortcomings and providing a sound alternative 
to classic international investment arbitration, but with its unique contribution 
and the measured incentive of its member states, it will remain with us for a 
period of considerable duration.
169. Trakman sees the adoption of BIT policies that provide investor-state parties with a choice 
among dispute-resolving measures, including access to domestic courts. See Trakman, “The 
ICSID Under Siege,” supra note 19.

